Introduction
The laws within a country, and the quality of their enforcement, are potentially important determinants of shareholder value. Investors rely on a country's judicial/legislative system to ensure their claims to an enterprise's future cash flows are honored. A country's legal and regulatory system also affects the ability of its firms' to raise capital, hire employees, and explore new investment opportunities. In all these endeavors, a corporate manager must rely on the stability of the judicial/legislative system, and the efficacy with which its laws are enforced. 1 In this study, we investigate the relation between shareholder value and corruption -defined as the misuse of public office for private gain. Corruption has emerged as a major issue in the global economy. Recent academic studies have examined the effect of corruption on a wide range of social and economic phenomena, including economic growth, direct foreign investment, and the quality of health care and educational services. 2 A number of international organizations also have an on-going mandate to combat corruption. 3 However, little is known about how the level of corruption in a country might affect the valuation of its corporations to shareholders.
Using firm-level data from 46 countries, we examine the empirical relation between corruption, as measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and international corporate values. 4 Our analysis takes advantage of recent advances in valuation theory and estimation techniques to control for country-, industry-, and firm-level characteristics that affect cross-border valuation. We show that these factors explain a substantial portion of the variations in firm values internationally. Moreover, we document a significant empirical relation between the level of corruption within a country and corporate values. 1 For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between law and finance, see La Porta et al. (1998) . 2 For example, Mauro (1995) investigates the effect of corruption on economic growth, Wei (1997) examines the effect of corruption on direct foreign investments, and Gupta et al. (2001) evaluates the association between corruption and the quality of healthcare and educational services. 3 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF; www.imf.org), the World Bank (www.worldbank.org), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; www.oecdwash.org), Transparency International (www.transparency.org) and Community Information, Empowerment and Transparency (CIET; www.ciet.org). 4 We discuss the composition of the CPI and the robustness of the results in detail later in the paper.
Specifically, our analysis shows that firms from more (less) corrupt countries trade at significantly lower (higher) market multiples. This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables suggested by valuation theory -i.e., cross-sectional variations associated with profitability, expected growth, risk, and R&D expenditures. In addition, we control for countrylevel variations in inflation, real GDP growth, GDP per capita, as well as proxies for shareholder rights and corporate governance. Even after controlling for these variables, we find that an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico results in a decrease of 18.1 in the price-to-earnings ratio (PE), and a decrease of 1.17 in the price-to-book ratio (PB).
Our study builds on, and extends, two main streams of research. First, we extend the valuation research on the relative pricing of firms using market multiples to an international arena.
Specifically, our results show that a set of economic drivers of firm value that was successful in explaining market multiples in the United States (e.g., Bhojraj and Lee (2001) ) can be adapted to explain global valuations with the addition of certain country-level factors. In fact, our results demonstrate the relative importance of country-, industry-, and firm-level variables in explaining variations in P/E and P/B multiples across countries.
Second, we extend the evidence on the economic consequences of corruption. In an increasingly integrated global economy, interest in (and awareness of) the effects of corruption is on the rise. 5 While presumption of the damaging effects of corruption is widespread, direct evidence on its economic consequences has been scarce. Contributing to the problem is the pervasive nature of corruption. Because corruption is associated with a variety of other social and economic illsincluding anemic economic growth, reduced foreign investment, reduced shareholder protection, lower healthcare and education spending -its direct impact on corporate values can be difficult to isolate.
Our study tackles this empirical challenge in several ways. First, we use firm-and industry-level data to increase the power of the tests. Second, we use numerous control variables to proxy for a 5 The international press is rife with coverage about corruption, ranging from drug-enforcement problems in Mexico, to Russia's vast gray economy. Corruption has been the subject of recent speeches by numerous world leaders, including Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, South Korea's Kim Young Sam, and the president of the World variety of other country-level factors that are correlated with corruption. Third, we use an instrumental variable approach to parse out the effect of corruption. After controlling for other factors, we document a significant empirical relation between country-level corruption and crossnational corporate valuation. While these results likely understate the total effect of corruption, they do provide support for the view that corruption has significant economic consequences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the vast literature on corruption, and discuss the theoretical link between corruption and shareholder value. In Section 3, we address issues in international valuation and the theory that underpins our empirical tests. This section also describes our sample, and motivates the various explanatory characteristics used in the study. Section 4 reports our empirical findings. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.
Corruption and Shareholder Value
In this section, we define the concept of corruption, discuss prior research on the determinants of corruption, and address measurement issues. We also discuss how the level of corruption in a country might affect corporate values.
What is Corruption?
Corruption is most commonly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain ((Klitgaard (1991; page 221), Transparency International (1995; pages 57-58) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1993; page 599)). It is a concept that extends beyond the act of bribery to encompass a wide range of behavior associated with the exercise of discretionary power in the public sector. Because every government in the world spends money, collects taxes, and otherwise regulates its citizens, all are susceptible to corruption. However, the incidence of corruption, and the prominent forms that it takes, varies across countries. 6 Bank. For information on the efforts of the World Bank and IMF to combat corruption, see Rose-Ackerman (1997, page 93) . 6 Elliott (1997) highlights the prominence of corruption in the global economy, and provides many examples.
What gives rise to corruption?
What gives rise to corruption? Most studies that address this subject frame the discussion in terms of a balancing act between the expected cost of a corrupt act and its expected benefits.
For example, Jain (2001, 77) observed:
[The] existence of corruption requires three elements to co-exist. First, someone must have discretionary power. Broadly defined, this power would include authority to design regulations, as well as to administer them. Second, there must be economic rent associated with this power…Third, the legal/judicial system must offer sufficiently low probability of detection and/or penalty for the wrongdoing.
In an extension of Becker's (1968) 'crime and punishment' argument, the first two elements combine to create incentives for corruption and the third acts as a deterrent. Corruption occurs when higher rents are associated with misuse of the discretionary powers, net of any illegal payments and penalties associated with such a misuse.
In one of the most comprehensive studies on the subject, Treisman (2000) argues that this cost-benefit analysis should consider social and psychological, as well as financial, factors.
He examines the relation between indices of "perceived corruption" (discussed in the next subsection) and a country's historical, cultural, economic, and political characteristics.
He finds that countries with lower corruption tend to be largely Protestant, former British colonies, have higher per capita income, a common law (versus civil law) legal system, a high ratio of imports to GDP, long exposure to democracy, and a unitary form of government. The direction of causality on economic development (per capita income) runs both ways. Treisman (2000) argues that these findings are broadly consistent with the theory on the expected costs and benefits of committing a corrupt act. 7
7 Treisman (2000) als o tests and finds a number of factors nominated by theory to be insignificant in explaining corruption. Among these are: the relative salaries of the public sector, the degree of political stability, the endowment of natural resources, the degree of state intervention in the economy (in the form of regulation or taxation), and the level of ethnic diversity. Rose-Ackerman (2001) shows that while the current degree of democracy is unimportant in explaining corruption, corruption does decrease after longer exposure to a democratic structure.
In sum, prior studies find that the level of corruption in a country is a function of its historical, religious, and cultural roots, and that corruption is also related to the level of economic development in the country, as well as its legal and governmental system. Taken individually, these variables do not appear to be prime candidates in explaining international equity values.
However, we include a number of these measures as controls or instrumental variables in our tests.
How is Corruption measured?
Most recent studies on corruption have used indices of "perceived" corruption prepared by business risk analysts and polling organizations, based on survey responses of businessmen and local residences. Among the most comprehensive indices are the Business International (BI) ratings, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index, and the Transparency International (TI) composite corruption score. 8
While these ratings are by definition "subjective", there are compelling reasons to take the patterns they reveal seriously. First, the ratings tend to be highly correlated with each other.
Different organizations using different techniques derive ratings that are similar and do not change much from year to year. As Treisman (2000) observed, indices of relative corruption constructed from the surveys of business people operating in specific countries turn out to be highly correlated with cross-national polls of the inhabitants of these countries. This reduces the chances that the results reflect the biases of a particular monitoring organization.
Second, empirical work confirms that these subjective ratings are correlated with a wide variety of economic and social phenomena. However subjective these evaluations might be, they appear to have explanatory power in many contexts. For example, Mauro (1995) shows that corruption lowers investment and impedes economic growth. Wei (1997) finds that an increase in corruption lowers the amount of direct foreign investment. Corruption also reduces government tax revenue (Ul Haque and Sahay (1996) , Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)), Johnson et al. (1999) ) and decreases spending on operations and maintenance, such as medicine and textbooks (Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) ).
In more recent studies, measures of relative corruption have been linked to other social and economic phenomena. For example, higher corruption is associated with rising military spending (Gupta, de Mello, and Sharan (2000) ), higher child mortality rates and higher student dropout rates (Gupta et al. (2001) ). Higher corruption also increases the size of the unofficial economy (Johnson et al. (1998)) , and is related to higher relative spread on sovereign bonds (Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng (2002) ) and Hall and Yago (2000)).
In short, although these corruption indices are subjective measures of individuals' perception, they appear to capture an important conceptual construct, which manifests itself in a variety of other forms in society. The picture that emerges from this literature is that the social and economic effects of corruption are significant, pervasive and generally negative.
In this study, we used four annual issues (1995 through 1998) of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International. The CPI is a "poll of polls", reflecting composite information from up to 12 individual surveys and ratings. The respondents are business people, risk analysts, and the general public. A country must be covered by at least three surveys to be included in the CPI. We chose this index because of its comprehensive coverage, and because it incorporates the results of other major indices. A copy of the index, as well as details on how it is constructed can be obtained from the Transparency International web site (www.transparency.org). 9
9 As a robustness check, we replicated our tests using the corruption rankings from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and obtained very similar results. The ICRG index is among the surveys included in the CPI.
The Transparency International CPI index is scaled so that it can range from 1 to 10. This index is a measure of "cleanness" rather than "corruption," because more corrupt countries receive a lower CPI score. Throughout this study, we reverse the coding by subtracting the CPI from 10, so that our measure of corruption ranges from 9 (extremely corrupt) to 0 (extremely clean).
Corruption and Shareholder Value
The dependent variables for our analysis are the price-to-book (PB) and price-to-earnings (PE) ratios of individual firms. Valuation theory provides guidance on the economic determinants of these ratios. In the next section, we develop this theory in much greater detail. However, it might be useful to first assess how corruption might affect shareholder value in broad terms.
As we will show in the next section, the price investors are willing to pay for a firm's earnings (or book value) is primarily driven by the firm's expected profitability, future growth (g) and level of risk (i.e., its cost of capital (r)). The theoretical literature identifies at least three channels through which corruption can affect these economic drivers of firm value.
First, corruption can drive up price and lower the level and quality of government output and services (Shleifer and Vishny (1993) ), including those services that have a direct effect on corporate activities. As we show later, higher corruption is indeed associated with higher inflation. Presumably in such environments investors will demand a higher expected return on their capital. A higher cost of capital has the effect of lowering the price paid per unit of earnings or asset, thus lowering P/E and P/B ratios.
Second, corruption can reduce investment and retard economic growth. The empirical evidence
shows that higher corruption is associated with lower investments and economic development (Mauro (1998) , Kaufmann et al. (1999b) ) and lower direct foreign investment (Wei (1997) ).
Growth is, of course, one of the key drivers of corporate values. To the extent that corruption lowers expected growth (g), we would anticipate that firms in more corrupt countries will trade at lower P/E and P/B multiples. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, 1999b) Our sense is that corruption encompasses a broader set of social behavior than is captured by shareholder protection. For example, public corruption is likely to be mirrored by similar behavior in the private sector. To the extent that unethical behavior in general increases contracting and monitoring costs, the adverse effect of corruption on corporate values can extend beyond legal protection of shareholders. In later tests, we evaluate the incremental effect of corruption by including such variables as the LLSV index of shareholder protection (Antidir) , the efficiency of the judicial system (Judsys), and the level of Accounting Standards (Accstand) as control variables.
As discussed earlier, the pervasive nature of corruption and the insidious nature of its effect on other economic variables, can pose a significant challenge to empirical researchers. In addition to the three control variables just described, we include a large number of other related countrylevel measures: Inflation, real GDP growth (GDPg), import as a percentage of GDP (Import/GDP), GDP per capita (GDP/cap), the country's stock market beta (Beta), as well as its advocate an alternative estimation technique. However, their measure is not available for periods before 1997. (Ex_beta) . To the extent that these variables are affected by corruption, our results will understate the total effect of corruption on firm valuation.
Valuation Theory and Model Estimation
The dependent variables for our analysis are the price-to-book (PB) and price-to-earnings (PE) ratios of individual firms. In this section, we present the valuation theory that identifies the economic determinants of these ratios. We also motivate the empirical constructs used to estimate our valuation model. Our discussion extends the multiple-based valuation approach in Bhojraj and Lee (2001) to an international setting.
Theoretical Determinants of Market Multiples
Valuation theory shows that explicit expressions can be derived for many market multiples using little more than the dividend discount model (DDM) and a few additional assumptions. For example, the residual income formula allows us to re-express the discounted dividend model in terms of the price-to-book ratio: 10 ,
where Pt * is the present value of expected dividends at time t, B t+i = expected book value at time t+i; r = cost of equity capital; and ROE t+i = return-on-equity, the expected after-tax return on book equity for period t+i.
This equation shows that a firm's price-to-book ratio is a function of its expected return-onequity (ROE), its cost-of-capital (r), and its future growth rate in book value (B t+i /B t ). Firms that have higher expected ROE, lower r, and higher growth rates, will trade at higher price-to-book ratios. In other words, the primary drivers of the P/B ratio should be its expected ROE, its cost of capital, and its expected rate of growth.
Accounting diversity problems across countries are minimized by the complementary nature of P/B and ROE. In brief, firms in countries with more conservative accounting practices will have lower book values (relative to their economic value). This results in higher P/B ratios, but also higher ROE measures. Therefore, at least in theory, this model is robust to differences in accounting practices across countries. 11
In the same spirit, it is not difficult to derive the price-to-earnings ratio in terms of expected growth rates, the dividend payout ratio, and the cost of capital. In the case of a stable growth firm, the price-to-earnings ratio can be expressed as: ,
where Pt * is the present value of future dividends at time t, E t = earnings at time t; k is a constant dividend payout ratio (dividends as a percentage of earnings); r = cost of equity capital;
and g is the expected earnings growth rate.
In the more general case, we can model the firm's growth in terms of an initial period (say n years) of high growth, followed by a period of more stable growth in perpetuity. Under this assumption, a firm's price-to-earnings ratio can be expressed as: ,
where Pt * is the present value of future dividends at time t, E t = earnings at time t; k is a constant payout ratio; r = cost of equity capital; g 1 is the initial earnings growth rate, which is applied for n years; and g 2 is the constant growth rate applicable from period n+1 onwards.
11 The theoretical model features an infinite horizon forecast of future cash flows. In practice, valuation models involve finite horizon forecasts, which introduce estimation errors that could be a function of a country's accounting practices. See Frankel and Lee (1999) for more details .
Equation (3) shows that a firm's P/E ratio should be a function of its dividend payout ratio (k), expected growth rates (g 1 and g 2 ), and cost of capital (r). If the market value of equity approximates the present value of expected cash flows, these variables should explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in the P/E ratio. In the tests that follow, we employ a multiple regression model to explain cross-national P/B and P/E ratios. The explanatory variables we use in the model are empirical proxies for the key elements in the righthand-side of Equations (1) and (3).
Sample Selection
Our initial sample of firms is derived from the Worldscope database. To complement the corruption index data from Transparency International, we focused our analysis on the 1995 to 1998 time period. 12 We required that each firm's home country (both country of origin and country of domicile) be clearly identified in the Worldscope database, and that the country is included in the Transparency International CPI rankings. 13 We obtained the total market capitalization for each firm based on closing market prices as of June 30 th of each year. In addition, we required the availability of the following data items, measured as of the most recent fiscal year end: total common equity, total long-term and shortterm debt, operating income, total assets, research and development expenditure, fiscal year-end date, and currency denomination. 14 In addition, we required each firm to have a one-year-ahead and a two-year-ahead consensus earnings forecast in the I/B/E/S International database as of the June statistical period each year. We derive a forecasted growth rate from these two earnings forecasts (see Appendix B for details). 15
12 We also had 1999 data. However, the introduction of the Euro in January 1999 complicated the computation of P/B and P/E ratios (accounting variables and prices were not always in the same currency). To avoid these problems, we limited our analysis to pre-1999 data. 13 Because of their peculiar status, American Deposit Receipts (ADR's) are excluded. There are three ways by which we identify the ADR's. First, Worldscope marks some firms with an ADR indicator. Second, the names of some firms are clearly labeled as ADR's. Third, some firms have a country of origin that is different from their country of domicile. We exclude all three. 14 To ensure that the accounting variables are available to the public and are reflected in firm price, the market price in June is matched to accounting data from a fiscal year that ended in the prior January or earlier. 15 In an earlier draft, we also used a separate sample based on historical growth rates to proxy for expected growth. Firms in the historical growth sample were required to have three past years of operating income available from
We exclude firms with negative common equity, negative current earnings, negative one-yearahead forecasted earnings and negative earnings in year t+2. In addition, to facilitate the estimation of a robust model, we rank firms annually on various attributes and exclude observations in the top and bottom 3% by price-to-book, price-earning, leverage, return-onequity, and forecasted growth rates. After these filters, we obtained 19,979 firm-year observations.
Model Estimation
Our research design involves the use of regression models that attempt to explain cross-national variations in P/E and P/B ratios. For this purpose, we compute four firm-level, and two industrylevel, explanatory variables. We are guided in the choice of these variables by the valuation equations discussed earlier. Following the methodology developed by Bhojraj and Lee (2001), we attempt to estimate relatively simple models that capture the key theoretical constructs of growth, risk, and profitability. Specifically, our model includes the following variables, which are also summarized and described in more detail in Appendix B:
Indpb -The harmonic mean of the price-to-book multiple for all the firms with the same twodigit SIC code for a given year. 16 This variable controls for industry-wide factors, such as growth rates and level of risk, and we expect it to be positively correlated with current year firmspecific PB ratios. It is used only in the PB regressions.
Indpe -The harmonic mean of the price-to-earnings multiple for all firms with the same twodigit SIC code for a given year. It controls for industry-wide factors and is only used in the PE regressions.
Worldscope. Since the number of observations was similar and the key results are unaffected, we do not report these results separately. 16 We use the harmonic means of industry PB and PE ratios, that is, the inverse of the average of inversed ratios, because they are more robust results than industry medians in these applications (See Baker and Ruback (1999) ).
Roe -Return on equity. This variable is net income before extraordinary items scaled by the end of period common equity. We expect this profitability measure to be a key driver of crosssectional variations in the PB ratio. It is only used in the PB regression.
Forecastg -Forecasted earnings growth based on I/B/E/S estimates. This variable is computed as the percentage increase implicit in the two-year-ahead forecast relative to the one-year-ahead forecast. Higher growth firms merit higher PE and PB ratios.
Lev -Book leverage. This variable is computed as total debt expressed as a percentage of total book equity. Firms with no reported debt are assigned a value of zero. Levered firms are riskier, ceteris paribus. Moreover, Gebhardt et al. (2001) suggest this measure is correlated with a firm's implied cost of capital. We therefore expect this variable to be negatively correlated with the two dependent variables.
R&D -Total research and development expenditures divided by sales. Firms with higher R&D
expenditures tend to understate current profitability relative to future profitability. To the extent that this variable captures expected earnings growth (and profitability) beyond Forecastg (and current ROE), we expect it to be positively correlated with the PE and PB ratios.
In addition to these industry and firm level variables, we also include seven country-level metrics as control variables:
Inflation and GDPg -These two macro-economic variables are suggested by valuation theory as potential factors in international valuation. Inflation is the annual inflation rate and GDPg is the annual real growth rate for each country. We expect inflation to be negatively correlated with firm values (see, for example, Nissim and Penman, 2001) and real GDP growth to be positively correlated. To ensure these measures were available to the public as of June each year, we used the prior year's numbers.
Judsys, Antidir, Acctstand -These three variables were featured in La Porta et al. (1998) as measures of the level of corporate governance and protection of minority shareholder rights.
Judsys is a measure of the efficacy of the judicial system, ranging from 0 (least efficient) to 10 (most efficient). Antidir is an aggregate index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) to capture shareholder rights within a country. Acctstand is a crude measure of the quality of financial reporting in a country, based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in seven categories.
Import/GDP and GDP/cap -We also include two variables identified by past studies to be correlated with corruption. Import/GDP is the proportion of annual country imports divided by the annual country GDP, which prior studies found is positively correlated with corruption at the country level (Treisman (2000), Gupta et al. (2001) ). GDP/cap, a measure of the wealth level of a country, is also correlated with corruption (Treisman (2000)). To ensure these measures are publicly available as of June 30 th , we used measures that pertain to the prior calendar year.
Although these two variables are not nominated by valuation, we include them as control variables in our regression. We also use them as instrumental variables in our two-stage least square regression.
Beta and Ex_Beta -Finally, we include two measures of country-level systematic risk. Market Beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) world stock index. Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate index of the US dollar. To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model:
The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located. We use returns on Morgan Stanley Capital Index (International Financial Corporation) country indices as proxies for country stock returns in industrial (developing) countries. The two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (r m -r f ), which is the excess dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor (∆ e), which is the return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7
(weighted by the relative stock-market capitalization). An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciated against the basket of currencies. The rolling 60-month index returns is used;
Beta and the Ex_beta are the estimated coefficients from this regression.
To recap, our research design involves estimating a series of regressions of either the PB or PE ratio on these control variables, together with the corruption variable (Corrupt), based on the reported CPI figure. Transparency International releases its annual CPI result around July of each year. This measure ranges between 9 (highly corrupt) and 0 (highly clean). Appendix B contains further details on how each of these variables is calculated.
Empirical Results

Descriptive Statistics
Appendix A presents descriptive statistics on the Transparency International data for our sample of 46 countries. The countries are listed in rank order by their average corruption score over the four annual surveys. Also reported in this table is the average number of firms per year, the standard deviation of the corruption score across different years, the number of surveys used to compile that country's CPI (based on 1998 data) and the standard deviation of the corruption score from the different surveys (again based on 1998 data).
Over our sample period, Denmark, New Zealand, and Finland received the best corruption rankings while Pakistan, Indonesia, and Venezuela received the worse. Most of the countries were ranked for four years. Only five countries were ranked for two years or fewer. The average number of firms per year ranged from 1 (Brazil and Venezuela) to 1,690 (United States). The number of surveys used to compile a country's composite CPI score ranged from 3 to 12. The standard deviation of the scores from these surveys ranges from 0.4 (Malaysia) to 1.7 (Greece). These standard deviation statistics provide some indication of the degree of agreement among surveys as to a country's relative ranking. th . The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998. Notice that the country-level variables (Corrupt, GDPg, Inflation, GDP/cap, Import/GDP, Acctstand, Antidir, Judsys, Beta, and Ex_beta) are common across firms in the same country, and the industry-level variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry.
Overall these statistics appear reasonable, with no indication that data errors are likely to be a serious problem.
Pairwise Correlations
Tables 2 reports the pairwise correlations among firm and industry level variables. Table values in the upper triangle are Spearman rank correlation coefficients, table values in the lower triangle are Pearson correlation coefficients. We compute the correlation table annually and report the time-series mean of the annual correlations. We report statistical significance on the basis of the consistency of the cross-sectional correlations over the four sample years.
The price-to-book ratio (PB) is correlated with all the other variables in the expected direction.
In particular, ROE is highly positively correlated with PB. PB is also positively correlated with both industry-level variables (Indpe and Indpb). Consistent with theory, PB is negatively correlated with Lev and positively correlated with R&D as well as forecasted growth.
The price-to-earnings (PE) ratio is also generally correlated with the other variables in the direction predicted by theory. In particular, as expected, firms with higher forecasted growth trade at higher PE multiples. PE is also positively correlated with R&D expense and industrial multiples (Indpb and Indpe). PE is negatively correlated with ROE, but some of the correlation is spurious (current earning appears in the numerator for the ROE calculation). Overall, Table 2 shows that most of the explanatory variables nominated by valuation theory operate as expected in the international setting. 17 Table 4 reports the results of a series of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions estimated using data available as of June of each year. The dependent variable in these regressions is either the PB ratio (Panel A) or the PE ratio (Panel B). The independent variables are as described in the previous section. We begin with a random effect model because it allows us to estimate the correlation matrix taking into account the country-level cross-correlations. The main advantage of this approach is that it produces a more efficient estimate than a fixed effect model. The main disadvantage is that the estimates are likely to be inconsistent. The random effect model maintains the severe assumption that any unobserved country effects in the error term are uncorrelated to the explanatory variables. In our case, the Hausman test statistics for these regressions show that the inconsistency introduced by the random effect model is severe for all four models. Therefore, for the remainder of our study, we use a fixed effect model with a separate dummy for each country.
Regression Analysis
Despite the known inconsistencies, Table 4 More importantly, the corruption measure is negative and significant in all three models in which it appears. Apparently firms from less corrupt countries earn higher PE multiples, controlling for the other factors.
It might be useful to consider the economic magnitude of these estimated coefficients. Panel A
shows that a one unit increase in the corruption index corresponds to approximately a 0.20 decrease in the PB ratio. Panel B shows that a one unit increase in the corruption index corresponds to approximately a decrease of 3.1 in the PE ratio. In other words, an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore (Corrupt score of 1.05) to that of Mexico (Corrupt score of 6.89) corresponds to a decrease of 18.1 in the PE ratio, and a decrease of 1.17 in the PB ratio.
Further Robustness Checks
Since Corrupt is a country-level measure, its ability to explain firm-level variations in PE and PB is likely to be affected by the inclusion of other country-level variables. The models we estimated already include country-level indicator variables, which control for unidentified variation at the country level. In addition, we have included country-level variables such as:
Inflation, GDPg, GDP/cap, and Import/GDP. However, it is still possible that Corrupt is serving as a proxy for another omitted country-level variable. Obviously, we run the risk of over controlling and thus eliminating the underlying theoretical construct of interest. Nevertheless, in this section, we explore variations in the basic model.
In Table 5 , we did not include the three corporate control and shareholder right variables (Judsys, Antidir, and Acctstand), because these measures do not change from year-to-year. As a result, their explanatory power is subsumed by the country-level fixed effect variables. However, it is possible that these variables have differential effects on firm value across the four years in our sample. In Table 6 , we conduct additional robustness checks that consider this possibility, as well as several instrumental variable regressions that attempt to disentangle the effect of corruption from that of GDP/cap and Import/GDP.
In Table 6 , we introduce interaction variables created by multiplying the year dummies with the three corporate control and shareholder rights variables: Judsys, Acctstand, and Antidir. The Fstatistics and P-values on these variables show that introducing a time-varying component modestly improves the overall fit. More importantly, Model 1 shows that the effect of corruption on PB (Panel A) and PE (Panel B) is unaffected by these perturbations. In fact, compared to Table 5 , the estimated coefficients on Corrupt are slightly more negative for both PE and PB.
Model 2 of Table 6 includes Import/GDP and GDP/cap in the regression. Neither variable is nominated by valuation theory per se, but both have been identified with corruption in past studies. We find that firms in countries with higher GDP/cap and higher Import/GDP have higher valuation multiples. The estimated coefficient on the corruption variable is smaller after adding these measures, but it remains significant for both the PB and the PE regression.
In Models 3 and 4, we attempt to parse out the effect of Corrupt using Import/GDP and GDP/cap as instrumental variables. The first-stage results show a high degree of fit (the adjusted r-square, reported in the table, is over 0.97), and the second stage results show that the fitted variable for corruption is strongly correlated with both PE and PB. If we believe that corruption has some effect on both GDP/cap and Import/GDP, then these results suggest that our earlier findings likely understate the effect of corruption on firm values.
As a further robustness check, we examine the effect of including proxies of country-level systematic risk in our analysis. Table 7 reports the results when we include a country's market beta (Beta) and currency exchange beta (Ex_beta). However, a country's market beta (Beta) has no significant incremental power in explaining PB ratios, and, contrary to theory, it exhibits a positive correlation with the PE ratio. We find that Ex_beta is negatively correlated with market multiples. More importantly, the coefficient on Corrupt remains significantly negative even with the inclusion of Beta and Ex_beta, as well as GDPg and Inflation.
Additional Analyses
So far, our findings show that the Corrupt variable is negatively correlated with market multiples after controlling for a wide set of other variables. In this subsection, we attempt to shed more light on the source of the correlation. terms between corruption and several firm-level value drivers. Specifically, we define HiCorr = 1 if a firm is from a country that received a Corrupt score of above 5.5 on average over time, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we define LoCorr = 1 if a firm is from a country that received on average a Corrupt score of below 2.5, and 0 otherwise. These cutoff values partition our sample into roughly 3 equal-sized sets of countries: 15 low-, 16 medium-, and 15 high-corruption countries.
We are interested in understanding how corruption affects the usefulness of current profitability (ROE), R&D expenditures (R&D), and forecasted growth (Forecastg) as drivers of firm value.
For example, if current profitability erodes quickly in highly corrupt regimes, we would expect a negative relation between HiCorr*ROE and PB. Similarly, if the benefits of current R&D or forecasted growth is lower for highly corrupt countries, we would expect negative coefficients on HiCorr*R&D and HiCorr*Forecastg, respectively. Conversely, if most of the effect derives from low corruption regimes, we would expect positive coefficients on the LoCorr interaction terms. As expected, Table 9 shows that the effect is weaker in both parts of the split sample. Corruption continues to be negatively correlated with both PB and PE in industrial countries, but has no incremental explanatory power for market multiples in the emerging country sub-sample. Part of the result is due to a lack of power in the developing country sub-sample, as we have only 3,268 to 3,418 observations. Moreover, the relative corruption in these countries tends to be similar, further reducing the power of this variable. In any event, it is clear from this table that our result is not driven by firms from a handful of developing countries.
Finally, Table 10 reports the results of estimations based on a maximum of 100 firms per country. One concern is that our results might be driven by a preponderance of firms from a few large countries. To construct this table, we limited our sample to the top 100 firms from each country by market capitalization. As expected, this restriction severely curtailed our sample (the total sample size decreases by more than 50%). Nevertheless, Table 10 shows that even in this highly restrictive sample, corruption is negatively correlated with firm values. As expected, both the statistical significance and the estimated coefficients are substantially lower than reported earlier, but the key inferences remain similar.
Conclusion
This study integrates the valuation literature in finance with a vast literature in political science and economics on corruption. Valuation theory demonstrates that the key economic drivers of firm value are growth, profitability and risk. However, little is known about how these drivers are affected by country-level factors in cross-national settings. In particular, we have no evidence on how corruption might affect international valuation.
As we demonstrate, the theoretical literature on corruption identifies at least three channels through which corruption might affect these economic drivers. First, corruption can drive up price and lower the level and quality of government output and services (Shleifer and Vishny (1993)), including those services that have a direct effect on corporate activities. Second, corruption can reduce investment and retard economic growth (Mauro (1998), Wei (1997), Kaufmann et al. (1999) ). Finally, corruption can reduce legal protection of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders (LaPorta et al. (2001)). Shareholders will demand a higher rate of return, on average, to compensate for this risk.
These arguments suggest that firms from more corrupt countries will trade at lower PE and PB multiples. Using firm-level data from 46 countries, we test this conjecture. Our tests show that firms from more (less) corrupt countries trade at significantly lower (higher) market multiples.
This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables suggested by valuation theory. In our primary estimations, we find that, on average, an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico corresponds to a decrease of 18.1 in the PE ratio, and a decrease of 1.17 in the PB ratio.
Although our corruption measures relate to a public sector phenomenon, this behavior is likely to be mirrored in private sector dealings as well. To our knowledge, the extent to which corruption in the public sector reflects corruption in the private sector has not been studied. However, if these two forms of corruption are positively correlated, it seems likely that both will affect contracting and monitoring costs within a country. The robustness of the corruption measure as an explanatory variable for international valuation, after controlling for many other variables, suggests to us that it might capture something beyond public sector misconduct. It is possible that our results reflect a broader phenomenon related to the cost of unethical conduct in general, both public and private. In essence, when trust cannot be assumed, contracting is more costly, and firm valuations are adversely affected. We regard this as in interesting area for further research.
As a minimum, our results suggest that a country's level of corruption has significant economic consequences for the shareholder value of its firms. These findings add to the growing literature on the effects of corruption. They also demonstrate how valuation techniques developed using data from the United States might be extended to an international setting. Given the number of country-level control variables included in this analysis, it is unlikely that the empirical relation we report is due to correlated omitted variables. In fact, we believe it is more likely that the effect we document understates the true impact of corruption on corporate values across international boundaries. 
Industry Level Variables:
Indpb Industry PB ratio Harmonic mean of the PB ratio for all firms in the same industry (based on 2-digit SIC code).
Indpe
Industry PE ratio Harmonic mean of the PE ratio for all firms in the same industry (based on 2-digit SIC code).
Country Level Variables:
Judsys Efficiency of the Judicial System Measure of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms" produced by the country-risk rating agency Business International Corporation. This measure ranges from 0 (less efficient) -10 (more efficient CPI is a measure of the degree of corruption as perceived by business people, risk analysts and the general public. This measure ranges between 9 (highly corrupt) and 0 (highly clean). Each country receives a composite score based on up to 12 surveys (see Appendix A). This table reports the means and various percentiles of the variables used in this study. These variables are described in detail in the appendix, briefly, they are: price-to-book ratio (PB), priceto-earning ratio (PE), return on equity (Roe), forecasted long-term growth (Forecastg), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), industrial harmonic mean of the price-to-book ratio (Indpb), industrial mean price-to-earnings (Indpe), efficiency of the judicial system (Judsys), anti-director rights (Antidir), accounting standards (Acctstand), annual imports-to-GDP (Imports/GDP), annual GDP per capita in dollars (GDP/cap), annual real GDP growth (GDPg), inflation, country-level stock return beta (Beta), country-level currency return beta (Ex_beta), and the Transparency-International Corruption Index (Corrupt). We include one observation per firmyear, sampled as of June 30 th each year. Notice that certain variables (Corruption, Inflation, GDPg, GDP/cap, Imports/GDP, Acctstand, Antidir, Judsys) are common across firms in the same country, and others (Indpb and Indpe) are common for firms in the same industry. The sample period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, inclusively. This following regression with random country effect is estimated using data as of June each year:
where V it is PB it in panel A and PE it in panel B. PB it (PE it ) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i, and C j,i,t is the j th characteristic of firm i in year t. The n firmcharacteristics are: return on equity (ROE), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted long-term growth (Forecastg), and the industrial harmonic means of the price-to-book ratio and price-to-earning ratio (Indpb and Indpe). Country-level variables include Inflation, real GDP growth (GDPg) and Corruption. The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, inclusive. (PE it ) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i in year t. The independent variable C j,i,t is the j th characteristic of firm i in year t.
The explanatory variables (firm, industry, and country characteristics) that we used are described in detail in Appendix B. In brief, they include: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-toNet-Sales (R&D), forecasted earnings growth rate (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt). Other control variables in the regression include GDP per capita (GDP/cap), Imports/GDP ratio (Imports/GDP), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation. Certain variables (Corrupt, GDP per capita, Imports/GDP ratio, real GDP growth, and Inflation) are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry. T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the estimates. Most models also include indicator variables for each country and year. Fstatistics for the year and country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below them. The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998. (PE it ) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i in year t. The independent variable C j,i,t is the j th characteristic of firm i in year t.
The explanatory variables (firm, industry, and country characteristics) that we used are described in detail in Appendix B. In brief, they include: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-toNet-Sales (R&D), forecasted earnings growth rate (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt). Other control variables in the regression include GDP per capita (GDP/cap), Imports/GDP ratio (Imports/GDP), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation. Certain variables (Corruption, GDP per capita, Imports/GDP, real GDP growth, and Inflation) are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry.
T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the estimates. All models include indicator variables for each country and year. F-statistics for the year and country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below them. Some models also include the interaction variables created by multiplying the year dummies with the following three corporate control and shareholder rights variables: judicial efficiency (Judsys), accounting standard (Acctstand), and anti-director's rights (Antidir) . The F-statistics and P-values for these variables are reported.
Models 3 and 4 in both panels are two-stage least squared (2SLS) regressions where GDP/cap and Imports/GDP ratio are used as instrumental variables for Corrupt. For these estimations, we report the first stage adjusted r-square, as well as the estimated coefficients and test-statistics from the second-stage. The number of observations is reported for each model. The sample period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, inclusive. (PE it ) is the year t price-tobook ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i in year t. The independent variable C j,i,t is the j th characteristic of firm i in year t.
The explanatory variables (firm, industry, and country characteristics) that we used are described in detail in Appendix B. In brief, they include: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net-Sales (R&D), forecasted earnings growth rate (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt). Other control variables in the regression include country beta (Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see the following description), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation. Certain variables (Corruption, GDP per capita, Import/GDP ratio, real GDP growth, Inflation, Ex_Beta, and Beta) are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry. T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the estimates. Most models also include indicator variables for each country and year. F-statistics for the year and country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below them. The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998. Country beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the MSCI world stock index. Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate index of the US dollar. To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model:
The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located. The two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (r m -r f ), which is the excess dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor which is the return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 (weighted by the relative stock-market capitalization). An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciates against the basket of currencies. The rolling 60-month return of the indices are used, and the regression coefficients are the Beta and the Ex_beta. Models 4 in both panels are two-stage least squared (2SLS) regressions where GDP/cap and Imports/GDP ratio are used as instrumental variables for Corrupt. For these estimations, we report the first stage adjusted r-square, as well as the estimated coefficients and test-statistics from the second-stage. The number of observations is reported for each model. The sample period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, inclusive. (PE it ) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-toearning ratio) for firm i, and C j,i,t is the j th characteristic of firm i in year t. The n firm-characteristics are: return on equity (ROE), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted long-term growth (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), and the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe). Other control variables in the regression include country beta (Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see the following description), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation. Certain variables (real GDP growth, Infla tion, Ex_Beta, and Beta) are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry.
HiCorr is an indicator variable that equals one in a country with high corruption (a score above 5.5 on average across years) and zero otherwise. LoCorr is the corresponding indicator variable for a country with low corruption (an average score below 2.5). HiCorr*ROE refers to the interaction variable formed by multiplying HiCorr with ROE. HiCorr*R&D and HiCorr*Forecastg are the interaction variables formed by multiplying HiCorr with R&D and Forecasted growth. Similarly, LoCorr is also multiplied by ROE, R&D and Forecastg to form the corresponding interaction variables.
The sample period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998. T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the estimates. Most models include indicator variables for each country and year. F-statistics for the year and country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below them.
Country beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the MSCI world stock index. Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate index of the US dollar. To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model:
The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located. The two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (r m -r f ), which is the excess dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor which is the return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 (weighted by the relative stock-market capitalization). An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciates against the basket of currencies. The rolling 60-month return of the indices is used, and the regression coefficients are the Beta and the Ex_beta. (PE it ) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i, and C j,i,t is the j th characteristic of firm i in year t.
The n firm-characteristics are: return on equity (ROE), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted long-term growth (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt). Other control variables in the regression include country beta (Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see the following description), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation. Certain variables (Corruption, real GDP growth, Inflation, Ex_Beta, and Beta) are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry. The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998.
The first two columns in each panel report results of the regressions for industrial countries, defined by the World Bank's IFC classification in 1998. The last two columns in each panel report the results of the regressions for developing countries, defined by the World Bank's IFC.
The n firm-characteristics are: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted long-term growth (Forecastg), industrial harmonic mean of the price-to-book ratio (Indpb), industrial harmonic mean of the price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt). Other control variables in the regression include country beta (Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see the following description), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation.
Certain variables (Corruption, real GDP growth, Inflation, Ex_Beta, and Beta) are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry. The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998. T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the estimates. The models include indicator variables for each country and year. F-statistics for the year and country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below them.
Country beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the MSCI world stock index. Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate index of the US dollar. To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model: The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located. The two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (r m -r f ), which is the excess dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor which is the return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 (weighted by the relative stock-market capitalization). An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciates against the basket of currencies. The rolling 60-month return of the indices is used, and the regression coefficients are the Beta and the Ex_beta. The International CAPM when Expected Returns are Time-varying 
